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Abstract
The World Bank has proposed an alternative hedging instrument to
be oﬀered by the FRECH, instead of the collar-swap currently available.
The suggested derivative corresponds to a European Cap option for the
real interest rate, which could give greater ﬂexibility to the hedging mech-
anism, allowing it to be tailored for the speciﬁc needs of each Colombian
Mortgage Bank (BECH). This paper ﬁnds the value of this derivative
and analyses the critiques that have been made about the pricing of the
collar-swap.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The recent episode of low real interest rates in Colombia has undermined the
interest of the BECH to purchase the hedging instrument (a collar-swap) cur-
rently oﬀered by the FRECH1. In the last four years, the data for this indicator
has been characterized by a signiﬁcantly lower mean vis à vis that of the period
1984-2001, with a lower volatility as well2.
Setting aside possible explanations to this phenomenon it is indisputable
that, had the BECH purchased the collar swap in 2001, they would have had in-
curred in signiﬁcant net contributions to the FRECH, up to the present. Despite
providing the BECH with insurance against real interest rate ”catastrophes”,
this would have had implied lesser cash ﬂows than those they have enjoyed due
to the ongoing low real rates, which has helped them heal their sick balances.
∗The views expressed herein correspond to the authors and may not coincide with those of
the Banco de la República or its Board of Governors. We gratefully acknowledge the comments
by Britt Gwinner, Leonardo Villar and Juan Pablo Zárate. The usual caveat applies.
1For a complete description of the FRECH, see Vásquez (2003).
2The average real interest rate for the past four years is 3.18% and the standard deviation
2.13%. The historic mean of the indicator (1984-2001) is 6.32% and the standard deviation
3.18%.
1In the light of this, several market analysts, including World Bank oﬃcials
among others, have expressed worries about the fact that the reticence of the
BECH to enter the contracts might be explained by i) an overpricing of the
collar swap, as the former claim, ii) The fact that the cost of the swap, even
if fairly priced, might be too high for the BECH to purchase it, as the World
Bank perceives or iii) The current hedging needs of the BECHs diﬀer, hence the
collar-swap seems inﬂexible to meet such speciﬁc needs, as the recent data from
the Superintendencia Bancaria suggests.
Our paper, thus, has two main objectives: 1) We oﬀer an alternative expla-
nation for the unwillingness of the BECH to demand the collar-swap oﬀered by
the FRECH, stressing it is fairly priced, and 2) Attending reasonings i) and ii)
above, we explore an alternative derivative to be oﬀered by the FRECH, which
could make its hedging nature more ﬂexible and tailor-made for each BECH.
This derivative corresponds to a European Cap option for the real interest rate,
over a notional of $4 trillion pesos (about $1.3 billion dollars)3 and 4 years of
duration. As we will show, this length for the contract matches the actual
average duration (measured as the McCaulay duration) of the mortgage assets
of the BECHs. We illustrate examples of such caps ranging from 4% to 8%.
These new contracts would allow each BECH to choose a diﬀerent cap level or
even hedge diﬀerent mortgage pools with diﬀerent caps. Moreover, the BECHs
could choose shorter maturity contracts or mix diﬀerent caplets at diﬀerent
maturities.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the second part we analyze
the discussion around the hedging mechanism currently oﬀered by the FRECH.
In the third we provide an alternative explanation to its apparent underperfor-
mance. In the fourth part we illustrate the design of the cap options and in
the ﬁfth, we extract relevant conclusions and policy recommendations.
2 Critiques to the Hedging Mechanism Oﬀered
by the FRECH
As i g n i ﬁcant share of the critiques directed to the hedging instrument oﬀered by
the FRECH stems from a misunderstanding of the true nature of the mechanism,
by incorrectly assuming that it is a short-run derivative. Since its creation, the
collar-swap was intended to be of a long-run duration, for it was supposed to
cover the long-run interest rate mismatch faced by the BECH.
Based on this misinterpretation, the hypothesis pointing to an over-pricing of
the collar-swap gained support, arguably explaining why these banks had been
reluctant to purchase it. Unfortunately for the FRECH, back in 2001 when
the derivative was designed, market information about future interest rates was
inexistent, leading the discussion to purely statistical grounds, where each side
argued in favor of one model or other to calculate the swap rate. The debate
3This corresponds to the approximate amount of mortgages that remain unhedged by the
mortgage banks.
2turned highly argumentative, leaving no room for agreement.
Luckily enough, the recent adoption of a methodology for the calculation of
spot curves for the interest rate of public debt issues4 has been crucial to void
the ”over-pricing” argument, for the current long-run spot rate is astonishingly
similar to that estimated for the collar-swap. Indeed, whilst the 4-year current
spot rate is 6.6%5, the long-run estimated value for the real interest rate of
the collar-swap is 6.82%. To put it bluntly, markets have acknowledged our
heuristic estimation for the swap rate. This has not only convinced many critics
about the fair pricing of the collar-swap, but has also drawn attention about the
expensiveness of the derivative, given the high levels of interest rate risk born
by the BECHs.
Other criticisms to the FRECH’s nature have been made, in terms of the
inﬂexibility of the derivative it oﬀers and the apparent counter-party risk em-
bedded in the contracts, due to the clause of limited liability that favours the
Fund.
On the ﬁrst issue, we agree in that the hedge instrument oﬀered by the
FRECH is somewhat rigid, in the sense that although it allows each BECH to
enter a contract with a diﬀerent notional amount (corresponding to the desired
coverage for a given stock of eligible mortgages), the swap rate is ﬁxed and equal
for every contract. The reason underlying this initial design relied on the fact
that back in 2000, all BECH were thought to bear the same degree of interest
rate risk. Nevertheless, this situation has changed dramatically over the past
two years, to the extent that some BECH could survive6 to shocks to the DTF
rate of up to 400 basis points with a year of persistence, as it is the case of
BECHs7 A and B, and to a lesser extent C and D, which could bear each 300
b.p. shocks of equal persistence, whilst E and F, in contrast, could get seriously
distressed if faced with shocks greater than 120 and 0 b.p., respectively (see
Janna, 2003).
It is worth noting, however, that although the level of real interest rate risk
born by several BECH may seem low, it is underestimated to some extent in
Janna’s calculations, who follows the methodology used by the Superintendencia
Bancaria due to the fact that the sort of shocks considered are mere parallel
shifts of the yield curve, without considering changes in convexity (i.e., on the
slope of the yield curve). Likewise, the maximum duration considered for the
mortgage portfolio of each BECH is of up to 12 months, which contrasts with
the actual durations displayed by these intermediaries, closer on average to 4
years8.
In any case, setting aside the discussion on the underestimation of the real
interest rate exposure faced by the BECH, it is indeed true that we see today
4See, Arango, Melo and Vásquez (2002).
5Calculated as of August 18th 2003.
6That is, without incurring in negative proﬁts.
7We ommit the names of the banks, following the secrecy regulations by Superintendencia
Bancaria.
8We use here a McCaulay duration as an approximation.
3marked diﬀerences in the risk born by each BECH9.T h i s ,per se,j u s t i ﬁes a
revision of the hedging instrument in order to make it more ﬂexible and tailor-
made for each institution.
On the other hand, the observation about the counter-party risk implied
by the limited liability of the FRECH in case its payments exceed the available
funds, denotes, again, a misunderstanding of the mechanism by those who claim
it. The FRECH was born from the good will of the Government to oﬀer a
derivative to help the BECH deal with the interest rate risk embedded in their
balance sheets, whilst they transform their funding schemes towards long-run
capital markets-based strategies. In the light of this, the FRECH may be
regarded as a subsidy with the precise objective to hedge the described risks
and therefore, as any other subsidy, it is ﬁnite in nature. In fact, the collar-
swap was designed to be non-neutral against the FRECH, i.e., the thresholds
were structured such that, in present value, the fund would exhaust its funds in
the BECH’s favor.
Nevertheless, the Fund is asymmetric in the sense that in the event of an
exhaustion of the funds given a suﬃciently strong real interest rate hike, the
limited liability clause would imply the liquidation of the FRECH, whereas there
is no bound for the BECH’s contributions in case of very low rate scenarios.
In a nutshell, the FRECH was meant to be a second best solution to the
BECHs’ interest rate risk exposure, whilst they carried on the proper funding
changes to put in motion ﬁrst best solutions to the problem (i.e., long-run capital
markets-based funding). Furthermore, markets have validated the collar-swap’s
pricing, given the close similarity of the swap’s rate with the long-run real
interest rate of UVR-indexed public debt.
In what follows, we build an argument to explain what we think are the true
underlying reasons that account for the reticence of the BECH to demand the
collar-swap.
3 W h yh a st h eC o l l a rS w a pO ﬀered by the FRECH
not been Demanded?
Amongst the sectors hit by the strong downturn of 1998-2002, the mortgage in-
dustry was ﬁrst and in particular, mortgage banks, not only for the deceleration
in the economic activity, but also for a series of rulings by the Constitutional
Court that induced a huge deal of uncertainty in the mortgage business.
Due to this and to the strong lobbying power of the mortgage sector derived
from decades of prosperity, the Colombian Government was acquiescent with
their critical condition when the time came to design policies to face the crisis,
spending no less than 6% of the GDP in the bailout.
Following the same logic, the Government, through the Supervisory bodies,
was particularly lax in implementing capital requirements for market risks for
9In fact, not only the BECH’s average mortgages as a share of total assets fell from 80.5%
in August 1999 to 66.7% in August 2003, but also the standard deviation increased from 7.7%
to 13.3%. This reinforces our argument on the heterogeneity of these intermediaries.
4the BECH, in line with international standards. This has resulted in the per-
sistence of the interest rate mismatch that these institutions bear, due to the
moderate eﬀort they have made to switch to long-run capital markets-based
funding. A proof to this assertion is the vulnerability to adverse DTF shocks
of several BECH, that we illustrate above.
In particular, the current capital requirements for market-risks have two
deﬁciencies10: 1) Assume a maximum duration of a BECH’s assets of 12 months
(See Janna and Muñoz, 2003) and 2) Only contemplate parallel shifts of the term
structure of interest rates, leaving aside convexity issues. As we stressed before,
the actual duration of the assets of a representative BECH is close to 4 years,
which implies, of course, that a strong shock to interest rates is expected to
induce as well changes in the slope of the term structure, and thus hit the entire
schedule of assets and liabilities (not just the 1-year maturity portion).
In the light of the aforementioned, our thesis points to the fact that, had the
BECH been subject to more stringent capital requirements for market risks, in
line with successful international regulatory practices, these institutions would
have had entered in contracts with the FRECH to avoid capitalizations of the
said mismatches. Clearly, it is more proﬁtable for the BECH to keep interest
rate risk within their balance sheets, in the absence of prudential regulations to
limit it, than to incur in costs to hedge it, such as the implied by the FRECH
derivative, especially in times in which rates are low, as the ones we have wit-
nessed during the past 4 years.
In any case, as we mentioned in the previous part of this paper, the interest
rate mismatch faced by the BECH is not homogeneous amongst them nowadays,
which justiﬁes a redesign of the hedging mechanism to make it more ﬂexible and
tailor-made for each institution. Moreover, as we show below, the design of the
new derivative we are proposing takes into account the asymmetry described
above, by means of a discount premium applied to the value of each option
contract. In short, the use of the European Cap options for the real interest rate,
as described herein, copes with two aspects of the collar-swap which the BECH
have manifested to be unappealing: 1) inﬂexibility, and 2) asymmetry. In
what follows, we describe the use of these derivatives, along the lines suggested
recently by several World Bank’s Oﬃcials.
4 European Cap Options for the Real Interest
Rate
Before getting into the model’s details, we deﬁne the real interest rate (in dis-







10It is important to note that, broadly speaking, the banking supervision has improved
dramatically in Colombia during the past 2-3 years. Nevertheless, certain aspects such as the
one we are focusing on, deserve further analysis and changes.
5where it corresponds to the tth observation of the nominal interest rate
(DTF) and ∆UVRt constitutes the tth observation of the annual growth of the
UVR, (which is calculated based on the lagged monthly inﬂation rate πt−1
11).
The reason for the hedging instrument to be designed for the real interest rate
rather than for the nominal DTF, is born in the fact that the BECH receive a
ﬂow of UVR-denominated income from their assets (mortgages, broadly speak-
ing) and pay a DTF-denominated ﬂow for their liabilities (mainly deposits).
The diﬀerence between these two rates corresponds precisely to the real interest
rate, which being low implies the funding of mortgages with deposits is relatively
cheap and in the opposite case, this type of funding becomes pretty expensive.
This interest rate risk mismatch that the BECHs face is what the FRECH is
meant to hedge.
To value the options in the absence of swap markets, one must: 1) Estimate
a model for the real interest rate and 2) Perform Montecarlo experiments using
the estimated model, in order to simulate possible interest rate scenarios and
hence, price the derivative. In what follows, we describe these two steps in
detail.
4.1 Estimation of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Model for the
Real Interest Rate12
The point of departure for our strategy is to assume that the real interest rate
follows a stationary diﬀusion process given by13:
dr(t)=−λ(r(t) − r)dt + σdB (2)
with r(0) = r0, λ ≥ 0 and t ∈ [0,∞),a n dw h e r edr is the inﬁnitesimal
real interest rate growth, λ is the convergence speed or mean reversion of the
process, σ corresponds to the volatility in the inﬁnitesimal growth of r, dB is a
stochastic process iid ∼ N (0,1) and r represents the parameter corresponding
to the long-run average real interest rate. The stochastic diﬀerential equation
(2), which corresponds to a continuous-time version of an AR(1)14 Gaussian
process, describes the growth of the real interest rate as a stationary stochastic
process with zero mean. Equation (2) corresponds to expression (17) of the
general equilibrium dynamic model by Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985), who
describe the dynamics of the real interest rate as a diﬀusion process with drift
−λ(r(t) − r) and variance σ2.
11That is, the 12-order diﬀerence of the monthly inﬂation rate.
12The versed reader can skip this section without loss of generality and continue with Chart
1 below, where the results of the estimation are shown.
13This is the conventional ”continous-time” format. However, we estimate the correspond-
ing ”discrete-time” version:
rt+1 − rt = −λ(rt − ¯ r)+σBt
where Bt ∼ iid N(0,1),a n dt is taken to be suﬃciently small.
14Campbell, Lo and McKinlay (1997) claim that such a stochastic process is analogous to an
O r n s t e i n - U h l e n b e c km o d e l ,w h i c hi nt u r nb e l o n g st oas u b s e to fB r o w n i a nm o t i o np r o c e s s e s .
6In order to estimate the parameters in (2), we use the Simulated Method
of Moments by Lee and Ingram (1991), which is a special case of the GMM
methodology proposed by Hansen (1982).
This method seeks to ﬁnd the parameters that guarantee the least ”distance”
between those of the observed series (xt) and the ones in the simulated (yj)j,f o r
which we deﬁne a vector (s × 1) of statistics or moments, calculated as the time
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where β is the vector of parameters that characterize the process described in
(2), i.e. (λ, ¯ r and σ). We assume ergodicity of the processes xt and yj (β), which
allows us to deﬁne a consistent and asymptotically normal estimator b βTN,s u c h
that it minimizes the weighted sum of the quadratic diﬀerence between HT (x)
and HN (yj (β)). Hence, given a symmetric random matrix (s × s) of weights
WT,t h ee s t i m a t o rb βTN is deﬁned as:
argmin
β
[HT (x) − HN (yj (β))]
0 WT [HT (x) − HN (yj (β))] (3)
















with k =1 ,···,nand t =1 ,···,T.
Under the assumption that n>1, we require that the length of the simulated
series is greater than its observed counterpart. Lee and Ingram (1991) argue
that the value of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix for b βTN depends
on the election of the weights matrix W , so that in order to obtain a consistent
estimator, they suggest W =[ ( 1+1 /n)Ω]



























where ut+p = h(xt+p) − (1/T)
T P
t=1
h(xt+p) , p is the number of autocovari-
ances diﬀerent from zero in h(xt) and w(i,p − 1) = 1 − i
p.
We use the ﬁrst four moments for the estimation of the parameters of ex-
pression (2) (i.e., mean, variance, kurtosis and skewness). Thus, the element
hs (xt) of the vector (4 × 1) of functions h(xt) is deﬁned as 1
σs (xt − x)
s , from





the estimation, we use data for rt as deﬁned in (1) above, for the period be-
tween January 1984 and July 2003. Chart 1 below shows the estimation results,
along with the goodness-of-ﬁt statistic proposed by the authors, where the null
15This estimator for the Variance-Covariance matrix is proposed by Newey and West (1987)
7hypothesis refers to the equality between the observed and simulated moments
and follows a χ2 distribution with one degree of freedom.
Chart 1







As it is shown, the estimated value for the equilibrium real interest rate r,
corresponds to 6.3%. In turn, the mean reversion is approximately 24.5%, which
implies a period of mean reversion, departing from the current real interest rate,
close to 20 months16. The standard deviation is about 3.1% and the value for
the goodness-of-ﬁt test, has a marginal signiﬁcance level of 3.65%17.
4.2 Pricing of the Cap Option
The cap option is deﬁned as a threshold for the real interest rate, over which
the FRECH is bound to pay the diﬀerence between the prevailing rate and the
cap, calculated over the notional of the contract. In other words, if the real
interest rate deﬁned in (1), surpasses the cap at any time during the length of
the contract, the hedge is made eﬀective18.
In order to value the cap, we perform Montecarlo experiments19 for the
process deﬁned in (2) for the real interest rate, taking into account the parame-
ters estimated, shown in Chart 1 above, taking in each run the present value20
of the expected hedge and then averaging over the set of replications. As the
starting point of each simulation, we use the current real interest rate, which
implies that the value of the option is a function of time21.
In what follows, we present the pricing of caps of 4%, 5%, 6.6%22,7 %a n d
8%. These are mere examples of the types of caps that the FRECH could oﬀer;
and hence, any other cap suggested by a BECH can be valued accordingly.
16Vásquez (2003) estimates the average length of the cycle for the real interest rate to be
48 months, approximately. Assuming that the current rate is in the lowest point of the cycle,
the rate would reach the equilibrium value in nearly two years.
17As Lee and Ingram (1989) show, the signiﬁcance of individual parameters is irrelevant,
and only the goodness-of-ﬁtt e s tb a s e do nt h eχ2 distribution is important.
18That is, if the condition is met (i.e., the real interest rate is greater than the cap in a
given month), the payment is calculated as the multiplicative diﬀerence between the monthly
equivalent of the observed real rate and the monthly equivalent of the cap, multiplied by the
notional of the contract.
19The number of replications used is 10.000.
20The discounting rates we use correspond to the spot rates from the term structure of
zero-coupon nominal public debt issues, calculated as of the 18th of August, 2003.
21That is, if the cap is purchased by a particular BECH in December, the price will diﬀer
from that of a cap valued today.
22This rate is equivalent to the 4-year spot rate of the term structure for government UVR-
indexed debt.
8Additionally, taking into account the said asymmetry present in the con-
tracts, in the sense that in case of a suﬃciently strong real interest rate hike
the FRECH could face an exhaustion of the funds for the hedge, which coupled
with the ”limited liability” clause of the contracts would make suboptimal the
ex post coverage in such a scenario, we calculate a discount premium for the
value of the option to account for this possibility.
With this in mind, we estimate the probability of the Fund’s exhaustion and
the average deﬁcit that would prevail in those extreme scenarios, using the same
Montecarlo experiments described above. This information is thence used to
calculate the value of the discount premium applied to the gross price of each
cap option, to take into account the eﬀect of the limited liability on the side of
the FRECH, embedded in each contract.
4.2.1 Standard Caps
As we suggested before, the value of each standard cap is estimated indepen-
dently, at levels of 4%, 5%, 6%, 6.6%, 7% and 8%. It is worth stressing that the
6.6% cap is equivalent to the 4-year spot rate of the term structure for govern-
ment UVR-indexed debt. We thus calculate 10.000 diﬀerent interest rate paths
for the interest rate described in (2), of 48 months long, using the estimated
parameters displayed in Chart 1. We average the present value of the excesses
of the real interest rate over each cap, calculated over a notional of $4 trillion
pesos (about $1.3 billion dollars).
Chart 2 below shows the gross23 and net prices for these options as well as
the probability in each case that the Fund is exhausted, with the corresponding
average deﬁcit. We also calculate, for reference purposes, the annual equivalent
c o s ti nb a s i sp o i n t so fe a c ho p t i o n 24.
23That is, without applying the discount premium.








(1 + i2)2 +
m
(1 + i3)3 +
m
(1 + i4)4
where m corresponds to the equivalent interest rate margin that the BECHs must forego if
they buy a cap and i is the corresponding spot rate from the term structure of zero-coupon
nominal public debt issues.
9Chart 2
Cap Values (billions of pesos) and Equivalent Annual Cost in Basis
Points
Value of Prob. Exhaustion Average Net Value Cost in
Cap (%) Cap Deficit Cap Basis Points
4.0 335.25 0.9920% 63.51 334.62 2.7990%
5.0 264.24 0.4360% 60.98 263.97 2.1992%
6.0 203.54 0.1270% 56.31 203.46 1.6994%
6.6 171.95 0.0451% 53.23 171.93 1.4328%
7.0 152.89 0.0191% 51.72 152.88 1.2662%
8.0 111.91 0.0010% 37.67 111.90 0.9330%
4 years
As expected, the cap’s price and haircut are negatively related to the cap
level25. Hence, for a cap of 4% a BECH would have to pay $334.62 billion
pesos (equivalent to $111.54 million dollars), whereas in case of a 6.6% cap the
price drops to $171.93 billion pesos (approximately $57.3 million dollars). In
terms of margin, the BECHs would have to forego 280 basis points per annum
to purchase a 4% cap and conversely, 143 b.p. per annum for a 6.6% cap.
5 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The World Bank has suggested a change in the type of hedging instrument
oﬀered by the FRECH, to make it more compatible with the needs of the BECH.
The new instrument corresponds to a set of European Cap options for the real
interest rate. This paper values these derivatives.
In particular, we explore diﬀerent levels of standard caps, for a period of
4 years and a notional amount of $4 trillion pesos (about $1.3 billion dollars).
This length for the contract matches the actual average duration (measured as
the McCaulay duration) of the mortgage assets of the BECHs. As an example,
we explore the pricing of cap levels at 4%, 5%, 6%, 6.6%, 7% and 8%. The
6.6% corresponds to the 4-year spot rate of the UVR-indexed public debt spot
curve.
Apart from the versatility of this type of derivatives, the cap options de-
scribed here have the advantage of being ﬂexible enough to be tailor-made for
the speciﬁc hedging needs of each BECH. Moreover, and bearing in mind that
the price of these types of options are a function of the date of the design of
the contract, other speciﬁc needs of hedging could be easily priced, including
contracts for shorter or longer periods and multiple or single caplets.
25It is important to note that the Fund does not charge a fee for the design of the caps, as
it is normally done with such derivatives.
10In short, the use of the European Cap options for the real interest rate
d e s c r i b e di nt h ep a p e rc o p ew i t ht w oi s s u e si m p l i e di nt h ed e s i g no ft h ec o l l a r -
swap currently available, which the BECH have manifested to be unappealing,
i.e., inﬂexibility, asymmetry.
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